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uring the 1980s, field
experiments were conducted in four states
to evaluate the potential of using cash
bonus offers to induce early return to
work by unemployment insurance (UI)
claimants. The first experiment was
initiated by the Illinois Employment
Security Department and was designed
with the assistance of the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. It
yielded encouraging results, which led the
U.S. Department of Labor to include a
somewhat different bonus treatment in a
New Jersey reemployment experiment.
Although the evidence from New
Jersey was not positive, the Labor
Department sponsored multi-treatment
experiments in Pennsylvania and
Washington in an attempt to refine the
findings from Illinois. Funding for the
Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments came from money that
Congress earmarked in 1987 to
investigate methods for promoting
reemployment of workers dislocated by
structural change in the economy. Results
from these experiments did not support
the idea that the reemployment bonus
could be a cost-effective way to promote
rapid reemployment, and policy
momentum for this bonus idea faded.
In 1994 and 1995, new mechanisms
for early identification of UI beneficiaries
who are likely to have long jobless spells
were implemented in all states as a result

of federal law. These mechanisms, called
profiling models, are currently being used
by states as a means to target early
reemployment assistance to dislocated
workers. They offer a natural means for
also targeting reemployment bonus offers.
This article summarizes recent research
findings which suggest that such targeting
may appreciably improve the costeffectiveness of the bonus.
The Bonus Experiments
The first reemployment bonus
experiment, conducted in Illinois during
1984-85, offered a $500 reemployment
bonus to UI claimants for returning to
work within 11 weeks and staying
employed at least 4 months. The bonus
reduced the duration of Ul-compensated
unemployment by more than a week and
saved much more in UI benefit payments
than it cost for bonus payments and
administration of the bonus offer
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
The reemployment bonus offer in the
1985-86 New Jersey experiment also had
a 4-month reemployment requirement,
but it had a 12-week qualification period
and a bonus amount which decreased as
the duration of insured unemployment
lengthened. The New Jersey experiment
raised questions about the benefits to the
(continued on p. 3)

SPRING 1998

Employment Research

From the Executive Director
One of the stated objectives of the
Upjohn Institute is to "communicate new
knowledge and scholarship effectively to
a wide audience of policy makers,
practitioners, and researchers." One of the
ways we seek to accomplish this objective
is through our publications program. In
1946, the Institute issued its first
. publication, entitled Apprenticeship and
On-the-Job Training for Veterans, which
explored effective ways to assimilate
returning GIs into the workplace. To
further its objective of disseminating
important research findings, the Institute
in 1978 established, and has since
maintained, a program of publishing
scholarly books.

issues, including edited volumes from
conferences sponsored by the National
Academy of Social Insurance and by the
Social Security Administration and the
National Institute of Disability and
Rehabilitation Research. With schooling
and welfare adding the word "work" to
their program descriptions (school-towork, welfare-to-work), the Institute has
published several books on recent welfare
reform initiatives and on educational
issues such as the effect of teacher pay on
teacher effectiveness and the role of
teachers, other staff, and school resources
on educational achievement. In addition,
consistent favorites among our readers are
books on labor-management relations.

We believe that this program has been
effective and valuable in informing the
targeted audience. In most instances, our
books offer cutting-edge analysis of
policy-relevant issues related to employ
ment problems. Equally important, in our
books we try to offer a single unbiased
source of background information about
the issues being explored. Many readers,
including professional economists and
policymakers, seek a reference that lays
out the issues, reviews what is known
from the research literature, and then
expands the envelope of knowledge in a
form that is self-contained and accessible.
The compliment I appreciate hearing the
most is when someone tells me that they
first turn to Upjohn Institute books as that
single source of objective information
about a specific employment program or
policy issue.

Most books published by the Institute
originate from our external Grant
Program or from our internal staff.
However, for several years we have also
frequently published books whose authors
are not otherwise connected with the
Institute. These volumes have originated
in various ways; from specific author
proposals, from conference proceedings,
or sometimes from sponsored research
without a publications outlet. Authors are
increasingly sending us unsolicited
manuscripts or detailed book outlines for
consideration. Among the recent
publications of this type are Lessons for
Welfare Reform by O'Neill and O'Neill;
Labor Law, Industrial Relations and
Employee Choice by Block, Beck, and
Kruger; and the volume of essays
assembled by Garth and Stephen
Mangum in honor of Sar Levitan entitled
Of Heart and Mind. Such volumes have
significantly enhanced the publications
offerings of the Institute.

The Institute's Publications Program
Over the years, Institute books have
explored the gamut of employment issues,
from the definitive two-volume treatment
of unemployment insurance, to the
productivity effects of employee profitsharing, to workplace training, access to
health care, and international com
parisons of job training programs. We
have devoted several books to disability

Expanding the Program
Now we are formalizing and
expanding this external program, and we
invite submission of publishable booklength works or proposals for books from
outside scholars and policy analysts.
Manuscripts and proposals will be

reviewed by Institute staff, and
manuscripts will receive external,
anonymous peer review if they appear to
fit our interests. Authors will receive an
assessment of their submission by the
publications staff of the Upjohn Institute
within four months. Assuming the project
is of mutual interest, the authors and the
Institute will sign a contract assigning
royalties and rights to the work. The book
would then be published, promoted, and
distributed by the Upjohn Institute. We
will also consider co-publishing
arrangements where that seems mutually
advantageous.
We believe that expanding this
program is an important investment in the
future of sound, useful, policy-relevant
research. We hope to continue to hear our
readers say that Upjohn Institute books
are their primary source of objective
information about employment policy
issues.
Randall W. Eberts

The Institute is interested in publishing
books in these areas:
Causes and consequences of unem
ployment
Compensation: earnings and benefits
Economic development of local labor
markets
Family labor issues
Labor-management relations
Social insurance and income mainte
nance programs
Work arrangements
Workforce quality: education and
training
See our Web site (at www.upjohninst.org/
research.html) for descriptions of these
areas.
Please submit manuscripts or proposals to
H. Allan Hunt
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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Washington, only four were cost-effective
from the perspective of the UI system
(Decker and O'Leary 1995).

Profiling for Reemployment Bonus Offers
(Continued from page J)

UI system from such a bonus offer
(Corson et al. 1989).
The states of Pennsylvania and
Washington each conducted separate
reemployment bonus experiments in
1988-89 involving a total of 11 different
treatments (Table 1). These treatments
were intended to supplement the
information from the Illinois experiment
by identifying which bonus amount and
qualification period was most effective.
Among the five treatments in
Pennsylvania and six treatments in

How Profiling Works
Profiling now operates in all states as
part of the Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system
and is a two-step process. The first step
excludes UI claimants expecting recall by
their previous employer and those who are
members of full-referral union hiring
halls. In the second step, those who are
most likely to exhaust UI benefits are
identified. Almost all states perform the

Table 1 Impacts on UI payments of Reemployment Bonus
Offers with and without Profiling ($ paid per
claimant)
Treatment
(bonus ami.,
qualif. period)

Full
sample

Top 50
percent

In statistical profiling models, the
factors used to help predict exhaustion
usually include education, job tenure,
change in employment in the prior
industry and occupation, and the local
unemployment rate. When workers open a
new claim for UI benefits, their personal
and labor market characteristics are
entered into a profiling equation to predict
their individual probability of exhausting
benefits. State WPRS systems then
quickly refer those with a high predicted

Table 2 Net Benefits to the UI System of Reemployment
Bonus Offers with and without Profiling ($ saved
per claimant)
Treatment
(bonus ami.,
qualif. period)

Top 25
percent

second step using a statistical model that
predicts the probability of benefit
exhaustion.

Full
sample

182

Low bonus,
short period

40

-119

-265

-159

Low bonus,
long period

24

108

49

5

-99

High bonus,
short period

-56

-138

-42

-261**

-199

High bonus,
long period

-28

68

13

-231

Declining
bonus

23

164
Washington

106

-103**

35

Low bonus,
long period

_69**

-211*

High bonus,
short period

-99*

High bonus,
long period

-130**
-61

-292**
Washington

Low bonus,
short period
Low bonus,
long period

22
112**

Top 25
percent

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania
Low bonus,
short period

Declining
bonus

Top 50
percent

-47
-187**

-78

Low bonus,
short period

-62

-2

17

-142

Low bonus,
long period

.

9

110

.55

-143

Medium bonus,
short period

-88

6

14

-33

12

Medium bonus,
long period

-129

-141

-203

_H7**

-126

-135

High bonus,
short period

-76

-97

-96

-136**

-228**

-280**

High bonus,
long period

-132

-94

-136

Medium bonus,
short period

-29

-121

Medium bonus,
long period

-44

High bonus,
short period
High bonus,
long period

*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
^^Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
Pennsylvania bonus amount: low = 3 X WBA (weekly benefit amount); high = 6 X WBA; declining = half the remaining UI
entitlement, with the initial offer good for 2 weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week.
Pennsylvania qualification period: short = 6 weeks; long =12 weeks.
Washington bonus amount: low = 2 X WBA; medium = 4 x WBA; high = 6 X WBA.
Washington qualification period: short = 0.2 X (potential UI duration) + 1 week; long = 0.4 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week.
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probability to special reemployment
assistance (Wandner 1997).
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Profiling the Bonus
A recent study (O'Leary, Decker, and
Wandner 1998) has investigated the
effects of targeting reemployment bonus
offers using profiling models and data
from the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments. Simulations were performed
using 1) the actual profiling models used
in Pennsylvania and Washington since
1994 and 2) new models for each state
estimated on the control group data from
the experiments using approximately the
same prediction factors that are currently
used by the states. Target groups were
defined by varying the threshold for
making a bonus offer between the 1 Oth
and 90th percentile in the distribution of
the predicted probability of benefit
exhaustion, and the effect on bonus
impacts for different target groups was
computed.
The findings suggest that targeting a
reemployment bonus to claimants with
high exhaustion probabilities can yield
larger reductions in UI payments than a
riontargeted bonus, but that targeting does
not guarantee larger reductions.
Furthermore, the use of a higher
probability threshold for targeting does
not necessarily translate into larger UI
reductions. Tables 1 and 2 summarize
these results, which are based on profiling
models estimated on data from the two
experiments and were somewhat stronger
than, but similar in magnitude and
direction to, those estimated using the
actual state models. In our estimates, the
lower threshold (bonus offers to the top
50 percent of beneficiaries, who are
predicted as most likely to exhaust
benefits) generally yielded larger impacts
on payments than targeting bonus offers
to the top 25 percent (Table 1). Hence,
targeting with a modest probability
threshold may maximize the impact of a
bonus offer on UI payments.

Cost-effectiveness
Previous examination of net benefits
for reemployment b.onus offers found
more favorable results as the perspective
broadened from the UI system, to all

government, to society as a whole. The
net benefits to the UI system of a
reemployment bonus offer are the
reduction in UI benefit payments, minus
the cost of bonus payments, minus any
additional costs of administering the
bonus. Untargeted bonus offers have
generally not been found to be costeffective from the crucial UI system
perspective.
Some bonus designs appear to
consistently yield positive net benefits
when targeted to the 50 percent group; in
particular, the targeted, long-qualificationperiod offers in Pennsylvania are all
estimated to be cost-effective (Table 2).
For Washington, the treatment with the
strongest cost-effective results also had a
long qualification period.
Targeting bonus offers to the top 25
percent most likely to exhaust benefits
yielded the same general pattern of
results. However, narrowing the targeted
group reduces the statistical significance
of impact estimates because sample sizes
decline. Such narrowing also reduces the
net savings on UI payments in four out of
five Pennsylvania treatments and in half
of the Washington treatments.
A reemployment bonus targeted to UI
claimants who are permanently separated
from their prior employer and likely to
exhaust their benefits is practical as a
cost-effective early intervention to
promote reemployment. Results from the
Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments suggest that a low bonus
amount combined with a long
qualification period targeted to the 50
percent most likely to exhaust UI benefits
is the best policy option.

Caveats
Targeting with profiling models
improves the appeal of the reemployment
bonus program. However, two potential
behavioral effects might reduce costeffectiveness in an operational program
(Meyer 1996). First, an actual bonus
program could have a displacement effect.
Displacement occurs if UI claimants
offered a bonus increase their rate of
reemployment at the expense of other job
seekers not offered a bonus. Second, there
is the risk that a bonus program could

induce an entry effect; that is, the
availability of a reemployment bonus
might result in a larger proportion of
unemployed job seekers filing for UI.
If the entry and displacement effects
are sizeable, actual program costeffectiveness will be lowered. However,
since only some UI claimants would
receive the bonus offer, targeting the
offers by profiling would introduce
uncertainty about the offer, thereby
reducing the chance of a large entry
effect. Targeting should also lower the
potential for displacement by reducing the
share of UI claimants offered a bonus.
Suggestions for further reading
Corson, Walter, Paul T. Decker, Shari ! !!
Miller Dunstan, and Anne R. Gordon
(1989). The New Jersey Unemployment
Insurance Reemployment Demonstration
Project: Final Evaluation Report.
j;;;; ;
Unemployment Insurance Occasional..'Mfy.
Paper 89-3, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and I
Training Administration.
Decker, Paul T., and Christopher ].
f:!:;;[
O'Leary (1995). "Evaluating Pooled
Evidence from the Reemployment Bonus
Experiments." Journal of Human
Resources (Summer): 534-550.
^A'P
Eberts, Randall W., and Christopher J.
O'Leary (1997). "Profiling and Referral to
Services of the Long-Term Unemployed:
Experiences and Lessons from Several
Countries." Employment Observatory:
Policies (inforMISEP), 60 (Winter): 32-39.
Meyer, Bruce D. 1995. "Lessons from the
U.S. Unemployment Insurance
PSs
Experiments." Journal of Economic
;; J
Literature (March): 91-131.
/^ffft
O'Leary, Christopher ]., Paul T. Decker,
and Stephen A. Wandner (1998).
Reemployment Bonuses and Profiling. ^
Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute
Working Paper 98-51 (January).
Wandner, Stephen A. (1997). "Early -*^*i
Reemployment for Dislocated Workers in
the United States." International Social
Security Review, 50 (4): 95-112.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Robert G.
Spiegelmari (1987). "Bonuses to Workers
and Employers to Reduce Unemployment
Randomized Trails in Illinois." American
Economic Review (September): 513-530.
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Jean Kimmel

D

ue to dramatic changes in family
structure and female labor force
participation, particularly the employment
of mothers of young children, nonmaterna] care for young children has
moved into the forefront of U.S. politics.
The extent to which the government
should intervene in work/family choices
by subsidizing paid work through child
care support is hotly debated. The
motivation for intervention is strong,
however, due to perceived problems faced
by workers with children. In particular,
low-income families typically must have
two earners to be financially independent,
and certainly most single mothers must
work to remain independent from welfare.
The fact that employment patterns of
mothers with preschool children have
changed so dramatically in the second
half of the twentieth century might
motivate a reconsideration of the
allocation of responsibility between
families and government. The dilemma
facing policymakers, in the face of limited
funding, is to provide assistance to those
families most in need without judging
their work choices or imposing too great a
distortion on these choices.
The social interest in child care policy
is twofold. First, there is a strong link
between child care and employment for
both married and single mothers. Because
of declining real wages for lessereducated workers, as well as changes in
social attitudes regarding female
employment, mothers in two-parent
families increasingly are likely to work
for pay. Labor force attachment for single
mothers is growing too, because of
changing attitudes and welfare reform.
The second social interest in child care
policy comes from the relationship
between child care and child
development, and the latter's link to adult

outcomes such as employability,
productivity, and criminal behavior.
Child Care and Employment
Because mothers in the United States
are the primary caregivers for their
children, when these mothers work for
pay, they must arrange for the care of their
children. Because quality care involves
high labor costs, the cost of child care is
relatively high and likely to remain so.
This high cost is burdensome for middleclass families, but the most acute
circumstances are those faced by the
welfare-to-work population and the
working poor. For these two groups
(nearly identical in financial
circumstances), child care expenses can
be 25 percent or more of earnings, such a
large percentage of the monthly budget
that it truly is a barrier to employment.
Child care policy can influence female
employment behavior directly via
subsidies that reduce the effective child
care price or indirectly through other
measures that influence child care
availability or quality. Kimmel (in press)
shows that the child care price elasticity
of employment for married mothers is
-0.9; that is, a 10 percent increase in
hourly child care prices causes a 9 percent
decrease in the average probability of
employment. For single mothers, this
elasticity is -0.2, while for low-income
white single mothers, the elasticity jumps
to -1.4. To get a better picture of the
importance of child care costs,
simulations can be run to gauge the
impact of hourly child care subsidies on
employment. For low-income white
single mothers, employment probabilities
increase from about 30 to 50 percent with
a 50 percent subsidy, and they more than
double with either a full subsidy or a

mixed subsidy based on income (Kimmel
1995).
There is a growing awareness of the
link between the quality of the care an
infant or toddler receives and the child's
intellectual and social development
(Barnett 1995). One problem in the
market for preschool child care is that
parents do not seem to be aware of what
provider characteristics contribute to
high-quality care, and even when they are
aware, the dollar value they place on such
quality care is insufficient to meet the
costs of providing that care (Council of
Economic Advisers 1997). How our
school-aged children are cared for is also
a quality issue. Many relatively young
children (aged 6 to 12 years old) are left
to fend for themselves after school. There
is some evidence that significant
improvements in the availability and
quality of after-school care would reduce
juvenile crime and other life-altering
negative behaviors (Fight Crime: Invest in
Kids 1988).
There are persistent shortages in the
supply of infant care, off-hours care, and
after-school care for school-aged
children. These shortages will become
more acute as welfare reform moves
forward because of more stringent work
requirements and the types of jobs that
welfare recipients are likely to get.
Another problem is that much child care
is of poor quality, and poor-quality child
care has the greatest negative impact on
those children coming from alreadychallenged home environments (Cost,
Quality, and Child Outcomes Study
Teams 1995). Finally, there are equity, or
distributional, concerns related to the high
cost of child care, particularly for lowerincome workers or those making the
welfare-to-work transition.
Federal Policy and Legislation
In 1993, about $17.3 billion was spent
by families on child care for children
under 5 years of age (U.S. Census Bureau
1995). In fiscal 1997, about $13.8 billion
was spent by the federal government,
largely in programs such as Head Start,
the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit
(or its counterpart, the Exclusion of
Employer Contributions for Child Care
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Expenses, otherwise known as flexible
spending accounts), and the Child Care
and Development Fund (the new child
care block grant to states). Clearly, the
federal government is already heavily
involved in the various markets that are
responsible for the care of young
children.
In January of this year, President
Clinton proposed several new child care
policy initiatives involving approximately
$20 billion in new federal funds. A quick
search of the Internet for congressional
activity regarding child care reveals over
50 proposals in the last year, although the
most recent (spring 1998) Republican
budget blueprint does not include any new
child care spending. Because subsidizing
child care affects the child care and
employment choices that families make,
politicians are wary of suggesting policies
that seem to encourage nonmaternal care
for young children; yet because so many
mothers rely on nonmaternal care already,
it is also politically smart to pay attention
to these mothers' preferences for ,
affordable, high-quality child care.
President Clinton's broad child care
policy package includes most of the
proposals suggested by individual
members of Congress, addressing
affordability for lower- or middle-class
workers, availability, and quality. One
additional proposal from the Republican
side concerns support for stay-at-home
mothers in two-parent families.
From distributional as well as
efficiency standpoints, policies that
address basic affordability concerns for
the working poor and those making the
welfare-to-work transition are most
critical. Dollar for dollar, child care
expenditures have the greatest impact on
these groups and also may tend to impose
the least distortion on work choices, given
that paid work is necessary for most poor
families. Of the current proposals under
consideration, increases in funding for
Head Start and the Child Care and
Development Fund are the most welltargeted by these criteria. The 1996
welfare reform legislation articulates a
national attitude that there are merits to
work beyond the paycheck. The likely
intergenerational benefits accruing from

attachment to the mainstream economy
are difficult to measure empirically but
still form part of the basis of this new
welfare policy. However, work for this
group must first be possible, meaning that
child care costs cannot exceed a welfare
mother's paycheck after housing and food
purchases. The GAO (1997) concluded
that even before the latest major welfare
reform, child care subsidies were
insufficient to meet the demand for such
support.
Affordability for the middle class is
addressed with increased funding for the
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit.
However, this credit (also available
through employer flexible spending
accounts) may be targeted too broadly,
providing benefits for families having
sufficient income to do without such
support. The federal tax dollars could be
better spent if targeted on more needy
subpopulations like the working poor and
the lower middle class. A move in this
direction would be to make this credit
refundable. As it exists currently, it is not
broadly available to those who are the
most financially needy, because the
lowest income workers owe no federal
taxes, particularly after recent increases in
the Earned Income Tax Credit. Adding
refundability to the Child and Dependent
Care Tax Credit could be financed in part
by phasing the credit out at higher income
levels. The affordability issue that the
Republican proposal addresses namely,
the budget problems faced by families
with a stay-at-home mother is
addressed, although minimally, in the
recently passed Child Tax Credit.
Legislation to provide funding to
influence quality, such as the money
allocated for quality in the new welfare
reform bill and the proposals by Clinton,
are good starts, although the expected
outcomes from the specific programs
proposed are unclear. Because some of
the quality problems in this market arise
from imperfect information, it would be
useful for the federal government to
implement a broad, national advertising
campaign to help educate parents about
quality child care and to direct them to
already available resources that help them
locate quality care.

Women and families face a
complicated set of choices, each with its
own opportunity costs, in trying to resolve
the work/family dilemma. While any
resolution involves largely personal
choices, there is a role for government,
particularly for the working poor, for both
equity and efficiency reasons. As for the
current child care policy proposals,
probably the most encouraging aspect of
them is that our elected officials seem to
be taking seriously the concepts that child
care is a critical factor influencing the
work decisions of mothers and fathers and
that nurturing our children both
psychologically and intellectually has a
strong influence on adult outcomes.
Suggestions for further reading
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New Books from the Upjohn Institute
Industrial
Incentives

Poverty and
Inequality
Stuart Dorsey

Competition among
American States
and Cities

Christopher Cornwell

Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters
University of Iowa

Florida State University

Fisher and Peters offer the first
significant attempt to quantify
economic development incentives
granted to firms by state and local
governments. The
authors' extensive
research focuses
on tax and nontax
incentive policies
across the 24 most
industrialized
states in the
United States and
a sample of 112
cities from within
those states. From this work they are
able to reveal
the extent to which incentive policies
are concentrated in economically
distressed localities
the redistributive effects of state and
local economic incentive programs
whether states subsidize competition
between municipalities
whether high-incentive munici
palities exist in high-incentive states
what proportion of local incentive
packages is discretionary and what
proportion is entitlement
(nondiscretionary)
what types of firms are targeted with
incentives, and what this says about
the goals of incentive policy.
"Economic development researchers
should consider this book a basic reference
tool. Economic developers who want to
know what the competition is doing should
also find this book to be essential reading."
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
305 pp. $29 cloth ISBN 0-88099-184-4
$19 paper ISBN 0-88099-183-6 / 1998

Baker University

The Political Economy
of Redistribution

University of Georgia

JonNeill, Editor

David Macpherson

Western Michigan University

Employers typically view their
investment in employees' pension
programs as a way to provide
retirement income for their workers.
Economists, on the other hand, see
private pensions playing a broader role
in the workplace. Besides being a
source-of retirement income, pensions
also serve as a means of enhancing
workplace productivity and lowering
labor costs. Dorsey, Cornwell, and
Macpherson explore the theoretical
and empirical
basis for the link
between pensions
and productivity
and, in the
process, offer a
complete and upto-date discussion
on the produc
tivity theory of
pensions.
They begin with a historical review
of institutional private pension
practices and government policies
related to pensions, then follow with a
discussion of employment models in
which training and monitoring costs
generate job-specific productivity
gains. Next they review a number of
empirical studies which test the
pension-productivity hypothesis, and
they present new estimates of
productivity gains for firms sponsoring
defined-benefit plans. The authors also
present new empirical evidence which
suggests a link between pension
incentives and employee training.
148 pp. $23 cloth ISBN 0-88099-186-0
$13 paper ISBN 0-88099-185-2 / 1998

In recent decades, as the economy
grew, policymakers could count on a
portion of this growth to "trickle
down" to those living at or below the
poverty line. Recent evidence,
however, suggests that this is no longer
the case. Despite the significant and
prolonged growth in prosperity that
began in 1993, the
portion of
aggregate income
going to the
poorest 20 percent
of the population
declined, while it
grew for the
richest 20 percent.
The six essays in
this volume
address the problem of widening
income distribution from a variety of
perspectives: Are distributional
changes limited to specific regions or
economies? What role does politics
play in redistribution? Why hasn't
recent growth in the U.S. economy
"trickled down?" What role did the
labor markets play in redistribution?
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